New faces but change is not imminent
Salbiah Ahmad
Most of us would like to believe the recent foreign press commentaries, that PAS has found its winning formula by the election of “reformist leaders to top posts, shunning hard-line clerics” in its 51st muktamar ( Washington Post, Jun 8 ). Or that the election of “Western-educated” Nasharuddin Mat Isa, as No 2 brings a promise of change.
As an aside, the foreign coverage is stereotypical. “Reformist” is equated with “Western”. “Hard-line clerics” are “fundamentalists”, as in not pro-reform or perhaps not pro-democracy.
But “hard-line cleric” Abdul Hadi Awang asserts that he is pro-democracy, “PAS akan memulihkan semula demokrasi di Negara ini yang semakin usang dan hampir lumpuh” (Harakahdaily.net, June 9).
The PAS president also reiterated that the party will not abandon among others, its Islamic state objective. He defended the leadership by ulama policy as the ulama are there “to criticize the party’s administration and to implement the party constitution which is based on the Quran and Hadith”. (malaysiakini, June 9)
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Will anything change with the new team? PAS central working committee member, Idris Ahmad, did not think so. “Policies will not change. It’s only faces of the leadership that change, not policies”. (Harakahdaily.net, June 9). Most of us at home would probably agree.
Political analyst, Farish Ahmad Noor is of the view that “The real test will come when progressive Islamists in PAS try to implement their more liberal and inclusive policies, and we will see the party’s reaction” (Adnkronos International, June 
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We were promised a reform agenda but Hadi Awang maintains that it is too early to reveal the plans (malaysiakini, June 9). There is no liberal usage of the words, “progressive” and “liberal” among the reformers.
The new team includes Kamaruddin Jaafar and Ahmad Awang. Together with Hadi Awang and Anwar Ibrahim, they share a past life in or with Abim (Malaysian Muslim Youth Movement) with the dream of an Islamist bid for power.
PAS-Abim alliance
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PAS had in 1975, after Anwar was released from prison (for the 1974 student uprising where some 1,169 Abim members were arrested), approached Anwar to formalize an alliance between PAS and Abim. While leaders in both were influenced by the teachings of Sayyid Qutb (Egypt), Mawdudi (Pakistan) and Khomeini (Iran), there were differences in approaches.
PAS view Islamic universalism as the strategy to reduce Malay attachment to nationalism and the way to end domination by Umno. However, the PAS ulama vision of an Islamic state was perceived as radical and not likely to work in multicultural Malaysia. It was also seen as alienating Malay middle classes as well. Abim, according to observers, did not openly call for an Islamic state at that time. It called for change in the socio-political system from below based on Islamic values which are interpreted to take into consideration Malaysia’s pluralism.
The various differences in views made an alliance problematic. Thus at a critical juncture in the late 70s these differences prevented a united challenge from PAS and Abim against Umno. (Nasr, 2001)
PAS democracy does not have an enviable track record in electoral politics. Since Merdeka it has only captured the imagination of the Malay heartland states in Terengganu (1959-1964, 1999-2004), and Kelantan (1959-1978, from 1999 todate).
The public outcry of electoral irregularities in 2004 does not overshadow the fact that there is no viable opposition and that PAS has no support of a large segment of multicultural Malaysia.
It has now wooed poster-boy of Muslim moderateness, Anwar Ibrahim to lead the coalition pact of PAS and Parti Keadilan Rakyat. Times have changed from the 70s. The next bid for power is 2008 and but there is little to show if the alliance will not continue to be problematic for opposition politics.
In his speeches at home, Anwar has pledged support of principles of constitutionalism and human rights. At a public lecture hosted by PKR at the Malaysian Bar some months ago, a lawyer who completed her reading in chambers took the former deputy prime minister to task on what he meant by that.
Pledge
In my recollection of events, the lawyer said that she has no right as a person born Malay and into the Muslim religion, to leave Islam in Malaysia. Would Anwar Ibrahim if he is in government support freedom of religion including the freedom to leave Islam as part of his pledge to constitutionalism and human rights?
She had to rephrase her question several times as his responses were not to the point. In what seemed like agitation at being cajoled, Anwar posed a question and a response. He said “Are you Muslim? If you are Muslim you have to follow the rules”.
One of the lawyers who had represented Anwar in his trials stood up at that point and opined that the question posed to Anwar was unfair as he was not a lawyer. This remark stripped several lawyers at the back of the room, of decorum. One lawyer sitting behind me, shouted, “Let the man speak for himself!” Still the most pertinent question asked of Anwar that evening was “Why should we put our weight behind you?” The same may be asked of PAS.
Until PAS and its allies make a case for a constitutional democracy that protects basic rights, a 2008 election victory is not within grasp.
Khaled Abou el-Fadl has done a thought provoking work on Islam and democracy where he makes an argument for the reconciliation of the democratic conception of people’s authority with an Islamic understanding of God’s authority. There are doctrinal problems with classic/medieval theory. The path to reconciliation lies in the underlying moral values in democracy and in Islam.
There are three values of particular importance in a Muslim polity in the Quran: pursuing justice through social cooperation and mutual assistance (Q 49:13; 11:119); establishing a non-autocratic, consultative method of governance; and institutionalising mercy and compassion in social relations (Q 6:12;54;21:107;27:27;29:51;45:20).
For example, the assigning of equal political rights to all adults (in a multicultural polity), democracy expresses that special status of human beings in God’s creation and enables humans to discharge that responsibility for making the world more just as God’s vicegerents (Q 2:30).
While democracy does not ensure justice, it does ensure a basis for pursuing justice and thus for fulfilling a fundamental responsibility assigned by God to each of us.
Rule of law
El-Fadl writes that to a believer, “God is all powerful and the ultimate owner of the heavens and the earth. But when it comes to laws in a political system, arguments that God is the sole legislator endorse a fatal fiction that is indefensible from the point of view of Islamic theology”.
He cites a report of a discussion between Ali, the last Righteous Caliph with the Khawarij to make his point of the tension between the meaning of legality and the rule of law.
Members of the Khawarij accused Ali of accepting the judgment and dominion of human beings instead of abiding by the dominion of God’s law. Ali brought a large copy of the Quran, touched it and instructed it to speak to the people and inform them about God’s law. The people exclaimed, “What are you doing? The Quran cannot speak, for it is not a human being!” Ali was reported to have said, “It is human beings who give effect to it according to their limited personal judgments and opinions”.
Ali’s central point is, God’s sovereignty provides no escape from the burdens of human agency.
The rule of law need not be taken to mean that the government is Syariah compliant or a government bound by a codebook of specific regulations. Instead, it might be interpreted as requiring a government bound by processes of making and interpreting laws. More importantly the rule of law requires that those processes themselves be bound by fundamental moral commitments, in particular to human dignity and freedom.
He has an argument about being Syariah compliant in his thesis, but I am not including that here. His article is cited.
Limited government
Shura or consultation signifies more broadly, resistance to autocracy, government by force or oppression. This is consistent with the juristic hostility towards despotism and whimsical and autocratic governance. If shura is expanded into a broader concept of a participatory government, the concerns about majority tyranny remains. To prevent that there must be a moral commitment which informs lawmaking and the process of lawmaking.
Thus, if shura is transformed into an instrument of participatory representation, it must be limited by a scheme of private and individual rights that serve as an overriding moral goal such as justice. Shura is valued not because of the results it produces but because it represents a moral value in itself. Thus dissent would also be tolerated because doing so is seen as a basic part of the mandate of justice.
What el-Fadl has done is a rethinking or reconceptualisation of political theory. It is always useful to have some clarity of concepts. The ideological plane is important for Muslim-majority Malaysia which hopes to strengthen its multicultural vision.
Indonesian Muslim-based parties have done it differently. Appreciating the diversity of interpretive views of medieval and contemporary tradition, very few parties play the Islamic state card in the elections. Parti Kesejahteraan Rakyat (PKS) in the last round in Indonesia, won with a call to eradicating corruption and protection of human rights. Diversity is respected and not a schism among parties nor between party and the electorate.
Suggested reading
Khaled Abou el-Fadl, Islam and the challenge of democracy. Boston Review (a political and literary forum).
Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr (2001), Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the making of state power. (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
Carrie R. Wickham (2002), Mobilising Islam: Religion, Activism and Political Change in Eqypt (Columbia University Press)
