The challenge of the East Asia Summit
Josh Hong
Imagine you are entrusted with the task of organising a party celebrating the founding of a neighbourhood committee soon. What would you do if two of the big players in the locality are quarreling with one another? Would you try to patch things up before the party, or call it off altogether?
Such was the dilemma uppermost on Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi’s mind when he delivered his keynote address at the Asia-Pacific Roundtable in Kuala Lumpur recently.
In his speech, the prime minister expressed his misgivings over the deteriorating bilateral relationship between the two East Asian giants – China and Japan – and appeared wary of its implications for the region as a whole.
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Yes, Abdullah has ample reasons to be concerned, because Malaysia is scheduled to play host to the East Asia Summit (EAS) – the first of its kind – towards the end of this year.
Given the current volatile relations between Beijing and Tokyo, not to mention Japan’s plethora of disputes with other Asian neighbours, Malaysia’s effort to showcase its bolehness by launching the EAS could well be stillborn if things really go wrong.
Lack of insight
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To be fair, Abdullah’s expression of concern, and an unusually frank one at that, over the complex Sino-Japanese issue is more than welcome, for it does point to the fact that his leadership has finally awoken to the need of paying more attention to the developments of the two most powerful and influential neighbours in order to secure the best interests for a small nation like Malaysia.
It was not so long ago, at the height of the Sino-Japanese tension following Japan’s attempt to revise WWII history and its bid for a permanent United Nations Security Council seat, that Abdullah was caught off-guard by the explosive scenario and forced to display his poorly disguised diplomatic tactlessness, muttering (as he always does) that ‘he trusted the two Asian powers would sort out their differences peacefully’.
You can’t blame Abdullah for his lack of insight in regard to the Sino-Japanese relations. In fact, it is amazing as well as puzzling to note that, after more than two decades of the Look East Policy, Malaysia is still characterised by its remarkable dearth of experts on Japan’s diplomacy, culture and history.
And it was not until some one year ago that the Malaysian government came to realise the need for a China centre, hence the eventual birth of the Institute of China Studies at Universiti Malaya. (And how effective the institute will be in shaping Malaysia’s foreign policy towards Beijing remains to be seen.)
Strange, isn’t it? The successive prime ministers have at one point or another stifled a comprehensive study of China as the most important country in this region for all the wrong reasons.
It is now hoped that other institutes dedicated to conducting substantial and substantive analysis on international and regional politics would come into being sooner rather than later. Should we all be surprised that, with a population smaller than Malaysia’s, Australia is arguably the best and most established centre of Indonesia-Malaysia studies in this part of the world?
Recent trends
Anyway, it is incumbent on the Malaysian government to dissect in greater depth the recent trends in East Asia in order for Malaysia to be a successful host of the much hyped up EAS in about six months from now. And, as Abdullah has said, things are not looking optimistic right now.
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Peace and security in East Asia depends to a great extent on the stable and beneficial relations between the two oldest neighbours – China and Japan - in the region. And, as many a scholar would argue, it is the first time in nearly a millennium that both of the giants are now vying for influence from their respective positions of strength – China militarily and politically, and Japan economically.
But Japan’s manoeuvre in East and Northeast Asia is limited by the fact that it is a theatre mostly dominated by Russia and China, and any ambition of the current leadership in Tokyo to pursue a more assertive foreign policy there will invariably be inhibited by another major player - the United States that is.
With this hard reality in mind, it is little wonder that Japan has been actively engaging itself in the affairs of Southeast Asia in recent years. True, that Japan has long been a benefactor in the development of a number of Asean countries since the 1960s, but there are signs that Tokyo is now stepping up its cooperation with the regional states not only economically, but politically and militarily also, and the maiden participation of Japan in Cobra Gold 2005 at the invitation of the US is a case in point.
According to a statement issued by the US embassy in Bangkok, the latest military exercise, which also involved the host country Thailand, Japan and Singapore, was carried out to promote ‘peace and security’. As a well-trained analyst would say, it is almost always ‘security’ that one is dealing with; ‘peace’ is only secondary but needed to make the agenda look benign and harmless.
The invitation extended to Tokyo by Washington comes as no surprise indeed, for it is in line with the objectives set out in the National Defense Strategy released by the Pentagon less than three months ago, according to which the US is prepared to achieve its strategic goals with the help of loosely assembled coalitions, instead of its ‘traditional allies’. Getting Singapore and Japan on board for Cobra Gold fits neatly into this grand strategy of the Bush administration.
The Cobra Gold exercise between the US and Thailand has long been lauded by some so-called analysts and strategists as a capacity-building mechanism in the face of a multitude of potential conflicts in the region of Southeast Asia. But the participation of Japan’s Self-Defence Forces, constitutionally barred from overseas mission, in Cobra Gold 2005 should make them think twice as to whether such exercise would indeed bring greater benefits to the region.
Since the Sept 11 attacks, the US has been more aware of Article 9 of Japan’s pacifist constitution, which has to be amended in order for the Self-Defence Forces to sail out of Japanese waters freely, hence the abetting voices from Washington and the sentiments among the Japanese public are slowly tilting towards a dangerous constitutional amendment of Article 9.
In 1991, Oskar Lafontaine, the once powerful socialist leader of Germany, was asked to comment on requests for a more active German participation in the Gulf War. His reply cannot be more shrewd and succinct: ‘You can’t offer brandy chocolates to a former alcoholic.’
Brandy chocolates
Apparently, the US has plenty of brandy chocolates to offer to Japan.
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Exasperated over the non-progress on the North Korea issue, Vice-President Dick Cheney raised the possibility of a nuclear-armed Japan as one consequence of a nuclear-armed North Korea in March 2003. Meanwhile, Charles Krauthammer, President Bush’s favourite conservative columnist, has made it plain that ‘If our nightmare is a nuclear North Korea, China’s is a nuclear Japan… it’s time to share the nightmares.’
The above stance of Cheney and Krauthammer does make me wonder how responsible the US can be as the only power that can rein in Koizumi’s ambition to ‘normalise’ his country.
Abdullah has made the right move by highlighting the issues confronting the region of East and Southeast Asia, but he also has to be pragmatic as to the limits of the role that Malaysia can play in this regard.
If a US-Japan Axis is formed, pitting itself against China (which does harbour its own strategic goals and ambitions), East Asia will no doubt be split down the middle. If this horrible scenario comes to past, Malaysia, with its scant influence and prestige, will most probably regret having offered to host the East Asia Summit in the first place.
