Review of morality laws - a bridge too far?
Salbiah Ahmad
Too much time had elapsed since my column, Let’s be civil about religion, for me to pick up where I left off there. There are also bits of arguments and analyses not covered in my last two columns and I am of two minds to pick these up as well.
But May, a friend, had recently called and that got me going again. She asked among other things, if the campaign on moral policing was also championed by the 100 or so Muslim ‘victims’ in the Jawi raid on Jan 20. We both laughed at the poser. I did not ask May why she laughed. My laughter was prompted by memories of our trial and error engagements with the public.
May’s query is part and parcel of a rule concerning agency. As activists, we share common induction courses. In several of these courses or sharing of experiences, locally and regionally, we learn to acknowledge, respect, build and support the agency of beneficiaries, the marginalised, the victims and the survivors. Beneficiaries are to be first empowered and consequently, as partners with activists, equally participate in mapping out the direction for change.
Thus our training in the field, the turun kepadang (going to the ground) experience, places much weight on consultation, public education or awareness-raising, only then mobilisation of the public including the victims/survivors in change for social transformation.
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A strategy for change may include law reform. Strategies are responses to a problem. It emphasises one’s approach or another depending on how the problem and the best way of solving it are perceived.
When a campaign chooses law reform as a strategy, it also becomes incumbent that campaigners are exposed to a critical assessment of law itself as an instrument to bring about change.
The role of law in bringing about change has more often been assumed rather than interrogated. Some studies on the use of law reform as a strategy, have shown that there are limits to the extent to which changes can be effected by law without a simultaneous movement to change the social and economic structures and culture of society.
Activism is about process
It is hard to see from the media reports if there has been an internal analysis by the campaigners on moral policing. Law reform was mooted within two months of the raid.
There may have been too much emphasis on press work through letters, press interviews and press releases with little emphasis on changes in public attitudes through old-style activism of public consultation (not limited to your own usual posse/networks) and mobilisation for informed collective action. Activism as I know it, is also about process.
As an observer of the campaign lobbied in the press, it is hard to determine what the legal strategy for law reform sought to address. Was it to address the ‘irregular use’ of power by Jawi officers? Was it to reform Jawi as a department? Was it to change the attitudes and behaviour of Muslim youths and their parents, Jawi officers, state muftis, (PAS president) Abdul Hadi Awang, the public?
It was as pointed out by other observers and actors, a blanket call. The secretary-general to Abim, Azizuddin Ahmad for instance, likened the proposal for law review as marahkan nyamuk, bakarkan kelambu (burning the mosquito net because one is angry with the mosquito). I think this is fair comment, not slander.
Even if it can be argued that there is a consistent campaign by the promoters before the Jan 20 incident, perhaps law reform as a strategy, a response to the (but which?) problem, should have been first interrogated. An analysis of the problem predicates strategy choice.
Strategy matrix
There is a tested strategy matrix used by law and development activists. If the promoters and campaigners have moved in regional networks on law, they might have some knowledge of this matrix developed in the 80s. Its old stuff but maintains its usefulness in clarifying effective strategies.
If the perception of the problem is one of attitudes or behaviour (culture), then the strategy may emphasise public education programmes and the public’s active participation.
If the perception of the problem is one relating to structures, then the strategy may emphasise engagement or challenging the institutions or structures. Strategies may emphasise the transformation or the creation of more responsive and accountable structures.
If the perception of the problem is one related to content of the law, then the strategy may emphasise law reform.
To achieve a level of change, all three components are of equal importance. An over emphasis of one may weaken strategic effectiveness of a campaign. Proponents of this strategy matrix maintain that effective change can be assured by participation of a conscious constituency in all three components.
This strategy matrix was offered as a framework of analysis to the campaigners for a law on domestic violence in Malaysia. It was a useful tool to help activists identify gaps and weaknesses in the campaign. Weaknesses were strengthened, skills were developed, specific institutions and public office relevant to
the campaign were lobbied.
Effective change comes through individual consciousness, then collective action. Change can of course come through patronage and power, but that according to the theory is short lived change. Patronage is about loyalties and not rights.
Do the stories of past experiences really teach anything at all? Maybe it’s just a hobby, something to do on a dull day.
The backwash that came with the moral policing campaign which was basically centred on opposing the law reform, may indicate gaps in the cultural and structural components using the matrix as a frame of reference.
Three months after Jan 20, it is clear that the cultural component has proven to be the field for major engagement. If some investment was made at the outset to the campaign in analysis of the perceived problems, perhaps the activists would have a clearer idea in mapping the direction for change.
Every choice we make comes with a price. How many steps forward did it take for us to fall several more steps behind?
