Dissent is part of justice
Salbiah Ahmad
Islah (reform) as sulh signifies peaceful action which leads to reconciliation and accord. Sulh is sometimes rendered as consensus, a democratic precept by any other name.
If we are guided by sulh in all the critical questions that affect our Malaysian society, then we should be prepared to listen to the multiplicity of voices of our entire population. The more important consideration of sulh to my mind is the assurance that the negotiation process or debate is fair, open and fully inclusive of all segments of the population.
Abdulaziz Sachedina in his spiritually-affirming thesis The Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism, (2001) proposes that Muslims identify with the growth of a religious consciousness that points beyond particular religious traditions to embrace pluralism.
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Religion today is different from religion in the 100 glorious years of the Muslim caliphate. In substance it seeks the realisation of a universal global community with a common vision and destiny. This is already visible in the peace movement, environmentalism and debates on the ethics of biotechnology and human cloning.
Sachedina thinks that religion in the 21 century and beyond provides a universal creed derived from the interaction between the conventional, particularistic organised religions and universal ethics of just human relationships. Institutionalised religiosity is now irrelevant.
The other concept found in Islamic tradition is shura (consultative deliberations). There is as usual a rich diversity of views on this concept among jurists of all schools and sects.
Khaled Abou el-Fadl, (2003) has no doubt that the imperative of shura is an important participatory ethic in the Islamic intellectual tradition. This is so, irrespective of how this ethic was used or misused in Islamic history because as a normative ideal it could be “co-opted and utilized in the furtherance of a democratic government”.
Dissent is part of justice
Shura, according to el Fadl must be valued not because of the results it produces, but because it represents a moral value in itself. As a result, regardless of the utility or disutility caused by the existence of dissenting views, dissent would be heard because doing so is seen as a basic part of the mandate of justice.
It is of course very possible that we may not be able to resolve all controversies on the basis of a shared moral belief. But I still think it is prudent to explore the parameters of resolution management and negotiate the terrain. We might take heart that even the prophet-reformers have to struggle with these issues.
Muslim groups and individuals in the conversations on the interfaith commission (IFC) and the Jawi raid have decried the so-called interference of non-Muslims on the premise that these two issues involve intra-faith matters among Muslims. These groups include Accin (coalition of 13 Muslim groups), Teras, Isra, MPF and the Kedah ulama association (PUK).
Harakahdaily reported on Feb 28 that all state muftis have long opposed the formation of the IFC on the grounds that the differences in religion would give rise to wrong implications. The muftis are however supportive of an interfaith dialogue.
There is no mention of the danger of differences and wrong implications thereto. The crux of the matter appears to be the “menyamakan agama Islam dengan agama lain tidak sepatutnya disokong”.
Isra, PUK and Teras in a joint statement on Feb 28 opposed the interference of non-Muslims in Muslim affairs claiming that there is a hidden agenda by certain parties to the IFC (usaha tidak ikhlas pihak tertentu) but that they are in agreement with the principle of democratic pluralism.
On Mar 23, Zaid Kamarudin of JIM who chairs Accin cautioned that “Crossing over into one another’s religion will always be a minefield”. He alludes to the “hidden agenda” alleged by members of the coalition as having to do with apostasy and inter-racial marriages and entertained the reservation that in these matters, human rights and religious rights in Islam would clash.
Islamic Outreach-Abim (an Accin partner) representative Mansor Ibrahim, believes that it is “wrong for apostasy to be equated with human rights”.
MPF through Dr Sheik Johari Bux on Mar 31, said that the Muslim disputes around the Jawi raid “concerns only Muslims and it is improper and insensitive for non-Muslims to interfere”.
Diversity of Muslim thought
While these opinions are opposed to non-Muslim ‘interference’, the premises or nature of the alleged interference are varied. It would also be necessary to state at the outset as rightly observed by Archbishop Murphy Pakiam that current Muslim opposition in the country does not reflect the diversity of views in Muslim thought.
“There is a wide variety of thought in Islam, whereas such groups may only represent one particular way of thinking within Islam”.
The Archbishop said this in comment to the sidelining of concerns of other Malaysians on the IFC. He is especially concerned with the cases brought to court by non Muslims where the civil courts and syariah courts often pass cases off to one another in order to avoid making contentious decisions on inter-religious issues.
In this light, it can be contended that where a situation arises where religious rights of more than one religion requires resolution in a single case, the stakes should be the same. It is hard to argue that Islam should be privileged in such a case. While some Muslims believe that Malaysia accords Islam a priority over other faiths, that view is contested by others, including some Muslims in this country.
The main controversy over the IFC appears to be the issue of apostasy of Muslims, the ‘hidden agenda’. This issue is partly a concern of Islamic law. It is not correct to assume that there is a particular view in Islam on apostasy.
Cultural and religious pluralism
Muslims know that the Quran has particular provisions which support the principle of non-compulsion in matters of belief. There is also a less cited but important verse to remind Muslims that if God so chooses, God could simply will people to become Muslims. But God refrained from doing that and it was not intended that the Prophet (alluding to Muslims as well) should “constrain the people until they are (become) believers” (Quran, 10:99).
I do not think it is too far-fetched to suggest that the Quran in this verse as well as various others in the same vein, emphasise the centrality of cultural and religious pluralism as a divinely ordained principle of peaceful coexistence among human societies.
“God’s law” as it were can only be understood through the prism of interpretation. We can only claim to speak in God’s name. Some of us do not even make that claim. We endeavour with all good intentions, to make an interpretation of the text which is methodologically sound, thus ‘authoritative’ (therefore ‘believable’ or persuasive) embodying an aspect of the truth of the message of the faith. Wallahualam, for the truth resides only with God.
There is a famous controversy on the methodology of privileging hadith literature over the Quran on apostasy. Every person who deems himself alim or mufti would know this. There are varying opinions of medieval jurists on apostasy and contemporary readings of the text which support the freedom of belief which includes the freedom not to believe.
We could pose a question as to why Muslims choose to select one and not the other interpretations on this issue and query the context in which such a choice is made. Is it merely a question of power and hegemony over sulh and shura? We need to confront the skeletons on this. We should not have to wait for another 350 years to work a resolution.
From the various contributions of the IFC’s steering committee to the press, I do not think it was envisaged that the IFC is a kind of a truth commission on religion. It does not usurp the institutions of government, including the judiciary. It does not adjudicate but merely make recommendations to inter alia the proper authorities.
If everything is so hunky-dory as claimed by certain Muslim groups in current NGO programmes on interfaith, then surely there is really no need for some other groups to float the IFC proposal?
Fear of secularism
It might be observed that there is persistent Muslim fear that Islam reformed is Islam that is relegated to the private realm separate from political activity. Thus a ‘secularised’ Islam means a privatised Islam or a ‘Westernised’ Islam. I think we can say with some certainty that ‘Westernised’ Muslims are not necessarily less Islamic. Surely we are not questioning the commitment of Muslims in ‘secular Western’ countries?
The campaigners on moral policing do not appear to have a clear rationale on whether their stand is premised on the privatisation of religion. The joint statement is unclear about the meaning of ‘state’ and how that fits into the theory of secularisation and privatisation of religion which refer to the state as a political entity and not the physical state as in the 12 states in Malaysia.
In saying that the “state has no role in policing morality”, the campaigners called for repeal of “provisions in religious and municipal laws” but appear quite happy with the Penal Code (The Sun, March 23).
The preference of the Penal Code over state enactments does appear inconsistent in a campaign on morality laws. In this I would agree with Dr Sheik Johari Bux of MPF that the “very foundation of the Penal Code itself is the preservation of morality.”
It does reflect perhaps a lack of thinking or confusion in the thrust of that campaign. It does portray the campaign as demonising state ‘morality’ laws but is a-ok with the Penal Code’s morality. We did have our most famous sodomy case tried under the Penal Code this century.
However, I do have a difference of opinion from Bux’s claim that “secularisation of society” is the forcing of “religion and spirituality into the private domain” in Bux’s letter to malaysiakini on Mar 31.
This is the new problematique in Malaysia. We are most fortunate that contemporary scholarship on Islam is addressing these particular concerns. The question of secularism has emerged as an object of academic argument and of practical dispute.
Talal Asad, (2003) as el Fadl, Sachedina, An-Naim and various scholars, emphasise in their writings and speeches that there is a considerable variation in the practice of secularism. It is unclear (even in ‘Western’ countries), to what extent the practice of secularism requires a separation of church and
state.
It is also unclear to what extent the practice of secularism mandate the exclusion of religion from the public domain, including the exclusion of religion as a source of law.
I do not suppose that we are any nearer to enlightenment over these contemporary questions. But I would resist throwing in the towel by claiming sensitivity of Muslims. We are in the boat together. It may be a slow boat to China.
References:
Abdulaziz Sachedina (2001), The Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Khaled Abou el-Fadl (2003), “ Islam and the Challenge of Democratic Commitment,” in Fordham Int’l Law Journal. Vol 27 No.1, 4-71
Talal Asad (2003), Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (California: Standford University Press).
